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CHAPTER II

THE EAST EUROPEAN SETTING

1. *General Factors*

In the early spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet armies breached the German defenses on the Dniester and the Bug and, advancing through the territories of pre-war Romania and Poland, entered a region which, for purposes of convenience, may be termed Eastern Europe.[1] By the time World War II had ended a year later Soviet power was established as far as the Elbe river in the west and the borders of Greece in the south. The path was cleared for Communist reorganization of Eastern Europe.

In the first months the primary lever of political and social change was the Soviet Army itself. But the new imperial apparatus did not long depend solely upon direct military intervention. In the wake of the advancing armies a well-organized political apparatus moved which, though few in numbers, was endowed with much of the militancy and dynamism of the Soviet system.

Generally, post-war Communist leadership was Moscow-trained, had served long apprenticeships in the Comintern apparatus, and was familiar with the hierarchal operations of an organization which invested all initiative in the Moscow center.[2] Although some of the leaders had led a furtive underground existence between the wars, they were no longer genuine revolutionaries, but agents of an imperial power designated with imposing the developed Soviet political and economic system on countries whose languages

[1] The term Eastern Europe, as used here, includes what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe, but does not include Russia, which is frequently considered part of Eastern Europe. Certain German writers, seeing in the region a mosaic of under-developed and politically weak states, have sometimes used the phrase *Zwischen-Europa* ("Between Europe"). For the purposes of this paper, the term Eastern Europe is taken to be coextensive with the Soviet satellite sphere, excluding East Germany, but including Yugoslavia whose regime broke with Moscow in 1948.

[2] The character of the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe is treated more fully below, pp. 42-43. For a good general account of these events, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 167-229.

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735 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 795 369 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

●175 186 These observations will help to explain the situation which followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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triarchal See of Constantinople were either broken completely or allowed to become loose and tenuous, in the West the structure of the Roman Catholic Church became more monolithic in fact, if not in theory. No doubt this divergence was rooted partly in theology, but one cause was the decline of Constantinople as an important Christian center and its subjection to Turkish rule.

Yet there could never be any doubt that both Churches were intensely and ardently Catholic. They kept the tradition of the priesthood as a sacramental ordination administered by bishops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

For every thoughtful Western Catholic the virtues and attitudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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and reverenced those who, however worthily or unworthily, represented it to the world. The Western Catholic is as free as anyone else to come to his insight into the fullness of the meaning of Christianity but he has a certainty held with profound gratitude that when he is in his Church he will not unwittingly find strange gods upon the altars.

In any event, the quest for reunion continued and reached, as has been indicated, an initial nadir during the period of the Crusades and a moment of optimistic hopefulness at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence during the fifteenth century. Only a brief reference to either is possible here. The Crusaders, who were roused by eloquent preachers like St. Bernard to take up arms and make the long journey eastward to wrest the Holy Places associated with the life and death of Our Lord from the Turks, served a consecrated cause; but many of them were very human, indeed. Some historians conclude from the sermons of St. Bernard and other preachers of the time that the purely mundane benefits which accrued to the men who took up the Cross were so great that many ruffians (contrary to romantic historians, the Middle Ages had their share of them) embarked on the adventure. It is also evident that although the Crusades owed their origin to an appeal for help from the Byzantine Emperor, to which the monks of Cluny responded as best they could, the net cultural result was that the East was not only disappointed in what the West could achieve but disgusted with the conduct of the armies, even as since that time many another occupied country has been with foreign soldiers who have been billeted on its soil. On the other hand, the West heard many a report about the corruption and venality of the East, even as the home people in this our day have listened to shocking stories of lands which their soldier sons have seen. It must be added that the subsequent continued dominion of the Turks likewise dampened the ardor of friendship.

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175 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a
795 spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which
641 Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was
829 compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept
795 across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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which became the great French Revolution of 1789 was also a rebellion against the privileged Church; and after the rise of a capitalistic society the estrangement of the poor from religion became the dominant fact in the cultural history of Western Europe. Hegelian philosophy—combining a doctrine of the constantly mobile and shifting Mind with a theory of the State as the sole primordially ordained center of permanence in an otherwise impermanent world—came to prominence at a time when dissatisfaction with Liberalism (in the continental sense) was breeding myths of political utopianism among the masses. Of these myths the strongest, temporarily at least, was the Marxist faith, rooted in a class-conscious usurpation of Hegelian thought. Yet observers who looked deeply into the wellsprings from which the intellectual behavior of the time was fed could see that a creed drastically counter to Marxism was arising in many different places, almost spontaneously. This might be termed dynamic traditionalism—that is, investing the past of man with sacredness and subsequently selecting from it forces and figures that could be made objects of the cult, in which the concept of human sacrality might receive a quasi-liturgical form. Perhaps such a force might be race, or classical antiquity, or one of the urges which some historians read into the Renaissance. To the exponents of dynamic traditionalism, the Catholic Church often seemed to be one great force among many others. For did it not have discipline, as Charles Maurras observed, and a heritage of beauty ranging all the way from the austerity of Cluny to the gorgeous splendor of St. Peter's?

This traditionalism tempted many Catholics—was indeed a far greater peril to orthodoxy than even the antecedent, all-pervading Liberalism. That no doubt had led not a few to believe that the Christian creed was outmoded and so could be made serviceable only by adapting it, more or less subtly, to the assumptions of modern scientific and philosophical

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thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

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The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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ivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
nergy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
rn Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
arger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this
egion were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism de-
eloped by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the
rench Revolution disseminated through cultural channels
nd by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars
ere most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and
ntil the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took
recedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a
alacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the
olitical framework established in 1815, and their policies
roduced significant results. It was only after the defeat of
beralism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that national-
sm came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly
ardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end
f the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance
f their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming
mong the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-
Iagyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe
chieved independence only to a limited degree before the
irst World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under
rm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these
ationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the
ble on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
ere the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
ost acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government
ating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the
ird in area and fourth in population among the European
owers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and ter-
torial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace set-
ement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies.

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

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came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

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Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War.

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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7. Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars

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Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Aegean, is a security zone both for the states of Western Europe and for Russia. Besides acting as a safety valve for neighboring powers, this region is a passageway between them. Military and population movements fan out from here into the East or converge into the West.

Both West and East have accused this part of Europe of being unstable and backward. Both have wanted to influence it and have not wanted to admit that the backwardness, confusion, and instability of this area are in large measure due to power politics. Tribes, peoples, and states have changed and have been changed in this region throughout the centuries. As a result, there is no stability of boundaries, or of peoples and governments. The evolution of the region can be viewed as a mirror which reflects the history of Europe with all its quirks and irregularities.

Although both world wars began in Eastern Europe, it would be absurd to claim that they were caused solely by these nations and their problems. The social, economic, and political interests of the great powers which clashed in this area and influenced its peoples played an important role in the course of events in Eastern Europe.

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11 Problems and Prospects of Federation

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I

The distribution of sovereign states in Central and in Eastern Europe has undergone some striking changes during the last one hundred years. A century ago, in 1853, there were six sovereign states between the Baltic Sea and the Aegean: the empires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, the kingdom of Greece, and the small principality of Montenegro. Two generations later, in 1913, there were ten states in the area, for by then Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania had all become sovereign states. Another ten years later, the number of states had increased to sixteen. Serbia and Montenegro had merged into Yugoslavia, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland had all been added as sovereign states. After the convulsions of the Second World War, thirteen sovereign states remained in what was now called Eastern Europe. They were the same states which had existed there during the 1920's and 1930's, with the exception of the three small Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which had become incorporated under the Soviet dictatorships in the style of the federal republics of the Soviet Union.

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By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Curtain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

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This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

• 175 433 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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Vienna was larger than Berlin and Austria did not appear to lag conspicuously behind Prussia; but by 1866 the lag had become conspicuous and was confirmed on the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. There seems to have been a significant acceleration of economic growth between 1880 and 1914; and it has been estimated that between 1900 and 1910 the percentage rate of growth in the national income of Austria was even somewhat faster than it was during the same decade in Western Europe. The percentage growth of the low income of Austria-Hungary was unable, nevertheless, to keep up with the very much higher levels of national income and industrial productivity which meanwhile had been attained in the West.

Such economic growth as did occur was quite unevenly distributed. The economic position of the Germans and a few other groups was a great deal better than that of the rest of the peoples concerned, and the attempts of non-German groups to equal German economic standards often brought them into economic competition and political friction with Germans. After the economic depression of 1873, German nationalists raised the cry for the preservation of German supremacy, and the very attempts to mitigate or overcome economic inequality thus led to intensified economic competition and political conflict.

Economic development was poorly distributed between town and country, as well as between nationalities. In most Western countries, country people had come to share many of the educational and cultural standards of the city populations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, even the German-Austrian peasants were described before the First World War by the Viennese architect, Adolph Loos, as people wearing different clothes, speaking a different language, and having an infinitely more primitive way of life than the populations of the cities.

The uneven distribution of economic opportunity was re-

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inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national, linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the nationalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the